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Recreational boating accidents in Wisconsin are subject to
the interplay, pre-emption and application of state and federal
statutory and substantive laws.' Generally, federal admiralty
and maritime law applies to accidents occurring on federal
admiralty waters, such as Wisconsin's Great Lakes and their
tributory waters or on the Wisconsin portion of the Mississippi
River and its tributaries, while state law applies to accidents
occurring on Wisconsin's inland waters which are not subject
to federal admiralty and maritime law. The site of the accident
and the choice of forum are crucial factors in determining the
procedure and outcome of the litigation.
The purpose of this article is to examine the laws applicable
to the federal and state waters of Wisconsin, to discuss the
principal rights of the parties to such litigation, and to consider
the potential varying results of an identical fact situation oc-
curring in each of these different waters.2
* A.B. 1960, Grinnel College; L.L.B. 1963, University of Wisconsin; member of
firm, McBurney, Musolf, & Whipple, S.C., Madison, Wisconsin.
1. During 1976 there were 161 reported boat accidents involving 226 boats in Wis-
consin as the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) Bureau of Law Enforcement
reports. (A reportable accident involves death, personal injury or in excess of $100 of
property damage. Wis. STAT. § 30.67(2) (1975)).
These accidents accounted for $174,056 in property damage, 30 drownings, 4
deaths by traumatic impact, 38 major injuries and 63 minor injuries. One
hundred (68%) of the accidents were caused by the fault of the boat operator.
Twenty (12.4%) persons falling overboard and sixteen (9.9%) were fault of the
equipment.
DNR, REPORT OF CERTIFICATES OF NuMBER ISSUED To BOATS, U.S.C.G. Form CGHQ
3923.
These figures do not necessarily include accidents on Wisconsin's federal waters
which are reportable to the United States Coast Guard under 46 U.S.C. §§ 1453(a),
1486 (1970).
2. As of December 31, 1976, there were 10,478 sailboats, 284,905 motorboats under
16 feet, 81,217 motor boats 16-26 feet, 2,322 motor boats 26-40 feet, 294 motor boats
40-65 feet, and 17 motor boats over 65 feet registered with the DNR pursuant to Wis.
STAT. § 30.51 (1975). In addition, there are unknown numbers of sailboats under 12
feet, government boats, canoes and other boats not propelled by machinery which are
exempt from registration. Wis. STAT. §§ 30.50(2) and 30.51 (1975). DNR, REPORT OF
CERTiFicATEs OF NUMBER ISSUED TO BOATS, U.S.C.G. Form CGHQ 3923. Over the last
ten years, there has been a 125% growth in ownership of recreational boats. The
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I. ADMIRALTY OR MARITIME ACTIVITIES - BACKGROUND
"The answer to [the question of what an admiralty or mari-
time activity is] will always be a little vague at the border line,
no matter how long the process of judicial inclusion and exclu-
sion goes on, and there were large doubts indeed, in the early
days of the Republic, as to the extent of the power conferred." ' 3
In DeLovio v. Bolt' the court's definition of admiralty court
jurisdiction was that it "comprehends all maritime contracts,
torts, and injuries . . . [and] extends over all contracts which
relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea."5
However, for the purpose and scope of this article, the federal
admiralty jurisdiction applies to the chartering of boats,' the
recovery of indemnity on marine insurance policies,7 suits in
tort for collision damage,8 physical damage to vessels on navig-
able waters,' personal injuries,"° wrongful death," product lia-
bility claims, 2 and oil spills and their attendant damages.'3
A. Nature and Jurisdiction of Admiralty Suits
Suits in admiralty are of two types: in personam and in rem.
"The in personam suit is unproblematical to the shore lawyer;
it is a suit against a named natural or corporate person, assert-
ing a personal liability. The in rem suit is virtually unknown
outside the admiralty courts,"" and is a suit against the inani-
increased number and horsepower of recreational boats logically lead to additional
speed, congestion and accidents on Wisconsin's navigable waters.
Wisconsin has 5.1% of all registered recreational boats nationally, not to mention
Illinois' 3.8%, Iowa's 1.5%, and Minnesota's 5.4%, some of which will use Wisconsin
waters. Milwaukee alone has an estimated 1.6% of all registered recreational boat
owners in the country. Boating '76 (distributed by the Boating Industry Assoc., 401
North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, IL 60611).
3. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 20 (2nd ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
4. 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776).
5. Id.
6. Morewood v. Enequist, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 491 (1860).
7. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 30-35 (1871).
8. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847).
9. Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. v. Philadelphia & Havre de Garce Steam Towboat
Co., 64 U.S. (23 How.) 209 (1860).
10. The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935).
11. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
12. Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Nav. Co., 416 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1969); Annot., 7
A.L.R. Fed. 502 (1971).
13. Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973); Annot., 26 A.L.R. Fed.
346 (1976).
14. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 35.
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mate object itself, whether ship or cargo, where it serves as the
collateral for the action as well as the object of the action.'" An
admiralty action for personal injuries as well as other maritime
torts can be brought as an in personam and/or an in rem ac-
tion.'" Tort claims can give rise to claims and/or judgments in
personam and/or in rem.' 7 As will be seen, in rem actions can
only be brought before federal courts.' 8
The United States Constitution provides that "[t]he judi-
cial power [of the United States] shall extend to all cases, in
law and equity, arising under . . . the laws of the United
States, . . . [and] to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction."' 9 Congress conveyed to the United States district
courts "original jurisdiction, exclusive of the Courts of the
States, of any civil cases of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled."20 The admiralty jurisdiction of the fed-
eral district courts is plenary and co-extensive with the consti-
tutional grant to the federal government of the judicial power
over admiralty and maritime matters.21 As a result of such
grant to the federal courts, states cannot create or enforce any
admiralty or maritime rule that conflicts either directly or indi-
rectly with federal law.2 2 Consequently, admiralty law as cre-
ated by Congress or the federal courts is controlling and may
not be contradicted by either state statute2 or by a judicial
determination from a state court.2 4
Once the issue at bar is within the sphere of admiralty or
maritime activity, the other criteria for federal court jurisdic-
tion such as the amount in controversy, 25 diversity of citizen-
15. 2 AM. JUR. 2d, Admiralty § 94 (1962).
16. The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 462 (1880); FED. R. Civ. P. Supplemental
Rule C.
17. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1973).
18. No in rem action can be brought in state courts because such an action is not
known as a common law remedy, thereby depriving state courts of jurisdiction. The
Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411
(1867). See text accompanying notes 37-38, infra.
19. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
21. The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903); Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill
Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883); Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1871).
22. Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142 (1928).
23. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
24. Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
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ship 2 or the presence of any federal question 27 are inapplica-
ble.2 However, if the action is being brought in a United States
district court as an admiralty case under the "saving to suit-
ors" clause29 of the Judiciary Act, i.e., an action in personam
and not in rem, then the requisite federal jurisdictional fact
such as the amount in controversy and diversity of citizenship
must be alleged.3 " Thus, the mere fact that an admiralty ques-
tion is involved or that there is a violation of the Motorboat Act
of 19403' or the Federal Boat Safety Act of 197132 does not
necessarily mean that there is a "federal question" under 28
U.S.C. section 1331(a). 33
B. The Effect of the "Saving to Suitors" Clause
The so-called "saving to suitors" clause of the Federal Judi-
ciary Act34 creates a duality of maritime jurisdiction between
the federal and state courts. The clause reserves to parties all
common law rights and remedies which can be given by state
courts. Such remedies are not restricted to proceedings as they
originally existed in a state at the enactment of the federal
legislation3 5 but also encompass all new rights given by statute
or state substantive law with the passage of time.36 Although
an in rem proceeding against the vessel as the offender 37 is not
within the "saving to suitors" clause, a state is free to adopt
such other remedies as it wishes and to prosecute the same so
long as no substantive changes are made in the maritime law. 36
State legislation and substantive law may not directly or
indirectly contradict established federal maritime law but may
26. Id.
27. Id. § 1331 (1970).
28. Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794); Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S.
68 (1877).
29. See discussion, footnotes 34-38 and accompanying text infra.
30. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1958).
31. 46 U.S.C. §§ 526-526u (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
32. Id. §§ 1451-1489 (Supp. V 1975).
33. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 368-73
(1958).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
35. Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1873).
36. Panama R.R. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557, 560-61 (1926); Warehouse & Builders
Supply Co. v. Galvin, 96 Wis. 523, 527-28, 71 N.W. 804, 805-06 (1897).
37. Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry, 237 U.S. 303 (1915).
38. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924), quoted in
Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 561 (1954); see Wis. STAT. § 801.07 (1975)
as to when a Wisconsin court may exercise jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem.
[Vol. 61:425
RECREATIONAL BOATING LAW
supplement federal law to the extent of allowing recovery in
some cases where it would otherwise be denied.39 Under state
law, for example, wrongful death actions outside of the Jones
Act,4" the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act,4" or the Death on the High Seas Act 42 had been treated as
supplementing admiralty law43 until becoming a federally rec-
ognized cause of action.44 Prohibited contradictions of mari-
time laws are illustrated by cases which unsuccessfully at-
tempted to apply state tort contribution law in admiralty" and
cases in which the action was brought in the state court under
the "saving to suitors" clause.46
The "saving to suitors" cause of action commenced in state
court does not prevent its removal to a federal court as a nonad-
miralty case if other jurisdictional requirements are met.4" The
result is that the plaintiff holding an in personam claim could
enforce it in personam in admiralty or may, at his election,
bring an ordinary civil action in either state or federal court
without reference to admiralty where the federal jurisdictional
prerequisites are met."
IX. APPLYING ADMIRALTY LAW
A. State Proceedings
Where the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
the admiralty courts under the "saving to suitors" clause, the
substantive law to be applied is that which would have been
applied had the action been brought in admiralty court.49
Under the "saving to suitors" clause, the Supreme Court
has modified the maritime jurisdictional definition of maritime
39. Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142 (1928).
40. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
41. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
42. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970).
43. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
44. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
45. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 406 U.S. 340
(1972).
46. See, e.g., Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
47. Williams v. Tide Water Ass'n Oil Co., 227 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 960 (1956).
48. Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry, 273 U.S. 303 (1915); Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 185 (1871).
49. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,
346 U.S. 406 (1953); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Chelentis
v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
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torts. A tort subject to the admiralty jurisdiction will be subject
to admiralty substantive law if the "substance and consumma-
tion" of the tort occurred on navigable waters of the United
States.5 0 This conceptual test of locality was applied to encom-
pass recreational boating in Coryell v. Phipps.5'
The locality test was further modified in 1962 by the Su-
preme Court's adoption of the "locality-plus" test for maritime
tort jurisdiction.- This test requires that the wrong must have
some relationship to a maritime service, navigation, or com-
merce on navigable waters in addition to satisfying the pre-
vious locality test. There must be such a relationship to tradi-
tional maritime activity as to justify the invocation of admi-
ralty jurisdiction. An example of the operation of the locality-
plus test is Oppen v. Aetna Insurance Co. 3 where pleasure boat
owners were permitted to sue in admiralty on a maritime tort
theory for damages caused by the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill.
The court specifically determined that pleasure boating is a
traditional maritime activity within the scope of Executive
Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland.54 Similarly, a woman
thrown from a negligently operated pleasure boat in federal
waters was able to recover in admiralty by treating the opera-
tion of pleasure boats as an historic maritime activity.5 A split
of opinion exists on the issue of whether water skiing is a recog-
nized maritime activity and therefore subject to admiralty
rules and procedures.
B. Wisconsin Maritime Suits
In Karasich v. Hasbrouck5 a boating accident in Milwau-
kee harbor was treated as any other Wisconsin tort action and
the defense of contributory negligence which normally is not
recognized in admiralty was permitted. Since factually this
was clearly an admiralty case, it can only be assumed that it
was conducted as a tort case because no party raised the admi-
ralty issue or removed it to federal court.
50. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 22 (1865).
51. 317 U.S. 406 (1943).
52. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
53. 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973).
54. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
55. St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1974); Kelly v. Smith,
485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973).
56. Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 675 (1966); 12 AM. JuR. 2d Boats and Boating § 54.
57. 28 Wis. 569 (1871).
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In Georgia Casualty Co. v. American Milling Co.-" a long-
shoreman's action which antedated the federal act equivalent
to longshoremen's worker's compensation 9 was conducted as
an ordinary civil action in tort and involved the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff. Although there are no admiralty
comments in the case, the action was permissible under the
"saving to suitors" clause since it was in personam and not in
rem.
6 0
Warehouse & Builder's Supply Co. v. Galvin6' involved a
replevin action by the owner-shipper of goods against the car-
rier of the goods and the ship's lien (in rem) upon the goods.
In contrast, the state action was dismissed because it was ad-
miralty in nature, and, as such, solely vested in the federal
courts under article III, section 2, United States Constitution,
and not preserved by the "saving to suitors" clause of the Judi-
ciary Act. This is the only case dismissed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court on the issue of lack of state court admiralty
jurisdiction.
C. Applicable Navigational Rules
The navigational rules for both the Mississippi River and
the Great Lakes and their tributaries were adopted for the
purpose of preventing collisions. 2 Each set of rules is catego-
rized into six basic divisions. The preliminary division provides
the general applicability, definitions and penalties for viola-
tions. 3 The rules apply to all boats regardless of type, mode of
propulsion or size. 4
The provisions include special lighting requirements used
under varying conditions on different types of boats.65 Also in-
cluded are regulations applicable to operations in a fog,66 such
as requirements regarding bells, whistles or sirens that are to
be used in a fog.67 The "rules of the road" provide for safe
58. 169 Wis. 456, 172 N.W. 148 (1919).
59. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
60. 169 Wis. at 460-61, 172 N.W. at 155, citing Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212
U.S. 215 (1909).
61. 96 Wis. 523, 71 N.W. 804 (1897).
62. 33 U.S.C. §§ 241, 301 (1970).
63. Id. §§ 241-244 (1970).
64. Id. §§ 242, 302 (1970).
65. Id. §§ 251-262, 311-323 (1970); 46 U.S.C. §§ 526-527(u) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).




steering and sailing." Deviation from them is permitted when
special circumstances exist which require departure in order to
avoid immediate danger. 9 Also included are provisions against
negligent operation and acts,7" and the penalties that may be
imposed. 71 Finally, the commandant of the Coast Guard is au-
thorized to promulgate regulations for the implementation of
the above rules.72
The Great Lakes Rules have no specific provisions for safety
equipment (other than lights) except that sailing vessels must
have an efficient fog horn and bell. 73 The Mississippi River
Rules do not require a sailboat to have any safety equipment
other than lighting except for bells on sailing vessels over
twenty-ton gross weight. 74 However, the Motorboat Act of 1940
does require various safety equipment on all boats capable of
being propelled by machinery and under 65 feet in length
which operate on federal navigable waters, including the Great
Lakes and the Mississippi River.75 The Act, in addition to re-
quiring lighting equipment and bells, requires life preservers,
fire extinguishers, carburetors equipped with flame arrestors,
and ventilating equipment.76 On its inland waters, the Wiscon-
sin law requires, in addition to lighting equipment on all boats,
adequate mufflers, life preservers, fire extinguishers, carbure-
tor flame arrestors, ventilators, and battery covers.77
Lakes Michigan and Superior and their tributaries together
with the Mississippi River and its tributaries are within the
federal admiralty jurisdiction. 78 Pine Creek, in the City of Ke-
nosha, Wisconsin, is within the federal jurisdiction too.7" By the
68. 33 U.S.C. §§ 281-293, 341-351 (1970).
69. Id. § 292 (1970).
70. 46 U.S.C. § 1461(d) (Supp. V 1975).
71. Id.
72. 33 U.S.C. § 243 (1970). See 33 U.S.C. § 353 (1970) (which is a similar provision
granting authority to establish navigational rules for certain western waters). See also
49 C.F.R. § 1.46(b) (1977). These Coast Guard regulations may be found in 33 C.F.R.
§ 90.01-6, 95.01-.80 (1977); Rules of the Road-Great Lakes, C.G.-172 (July 1, 1972);
Rules of the Road-Western Rivers, C.G.-184 (August 1, 1972).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 271 (1970).
74. Id. § 331 (1970).
75. 46 U.S.C. 88 526-526u (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
76. Id. 88 526b-e, 526g-i (1970).
77. Wis. STAT. § 30.62 (1975); Wis. ADM. CODE §§ NR 5.10, .11, & .13.
78. The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867); The Propeller Genesee Chief
v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 453-57 (1851).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 57 (1970).
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process of exclusion, all other waters of the State of Wisconsin
are nonadmiralty inland waters and subject solely to the laws
and procedures of the state."
In examining the Wisconsin rules, the various requirements
for sail and motor boats on the state's inland waters are found
in Chapter 30 of the Wisconsin Statutes. The "rules of the
road" are concerned with traffic, 8' speed restrictions 2 and gen-
eral prohibited operations 3 which include intoxicated or negli-
gent operation, improper seating of passengers, creating a haz-
ardous wake, anchoring in traffic lanes, overloading, overpow-
ering, and unnecessary noise. Reckless conduct and operation
of a recreational boat could well be contained within the scope
of the Wisconsin criminal statute against conduct regardless of
life."8
The enforcement of the federal boating laws has been dele-
gated to the United States Coast Guard85 and for inland waters
to the Department of Natural Resources of the state and local
authorities.8 1
If the Coast Guard officer reasonably believes a boat is
being operated in a negligent manner or that it lacks the re-
quired safety equipment thereby creating "an exceptionally
hazardous condition," he can board and inspect the boat, di-
rect it to return to port or take other steps reasonably necessary
for crew and occupant safety. 7 On state waters, a Wisconsin
law enforcement officer who has "reasonable cause to believe
there is a violation '8 may stop and board a boat for the pur-
pose of enforcing the state's boating laws, regulations or ordi-
nances.
D. Resulting Peculiarities
Past application of admiralty law in state or federal courts
has brought about what may be considered peculiar results
pertaining to trial by jury and divided damages. In regard to
80. See Morse v. Home Ins. Co., 30 Wis. 496, 505-07 (1872) (concerning the Fox
and Wolf Rivers). See generally GILMORE & BLAcK, supra note 3, at 32-33.
81. Wis. STAT. § 30.65 (1975).
82. Id. § 30.66 (1975).
83. Id. § 30.68 (1975).
84. Id. § 941.30 (1975).
85. 33 U.S.C. §§ 243, 353 (1970); 46 U.S.C. § 526 (1970).
86. Wis. STAT. §§ 30.74(3), .77 (West 1973).
87. 46 U.S.C. § 1462 (Supp. V 1975).
88. Wis. STAT. ANN § 30.79(3) (West 1973).
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trial by jury, the general rule is that admiralty cases are tried
by the court with no right to such a jury. 9 But Congress does
have the right to provide for a trial by jury in admiralty cases
if it deems it appropriate,"0 and it has so provided for jury trials
with respect to admiralty suits brought on the Great Lakes.9'
The general rule that there is no right to a jury trial in admi-
ralty suits is applicable, however, to the Mississippi River.
Pertaining to damages, if the boating accident occurred on
the inland waters of Wisconsin, the state law of comparative
negligence would apply.92 However, in admiralty, comparative
negligence is not applicable. Rather, the divided damages rule
is used whether the case is tried in either a Wisconsin or federal
court.93 If, however, the action is for wrongful death, the state's
rules on contributory or comparative negligence will be ap-
plied.94 Should the wrongful death action arise under a federal
statute then this pre-empts the application of the state law.95
The two main federal wrongful death statutes are the Jones
Act and the Death on the High Seas Act. The Death on the
High Seas Act, however, is not applied to the Great Lakes or
the Mississippi River by definition,9" and the Jones Act is only
applicable to the extent that the injured or deceased person is
a seaman employee of the vessel. Absent a federal statute, the
state's wrongful death statute will be enforced in an admiralty
proceeding whether the proceeding is in rem (against only the
ship itself) or in personam (against individuals).99 An admi-
ralty cause of action for wrongful death in rem against the
vessel does not lie in either admiralty or state court unless,
under the state law, the claimant actually has a right to an in
rem action leading to a lien against the property.' 9 Wisconsin
has no in rem action for wrongful death.
89. The Margaret, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 116 (1824); FED. R. Civ. P. § 1, 9(h), 38(c),
81.
90. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1970).
92. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.045, .048 (West 1966).
93. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
94. Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
95. Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
96. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
97. Id. §§ 761-68 (1970).
98. Id. § 767 (1970).
99. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941).
100. The Corsair, 145 U.S. 335 (1892).
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The effect of the admiralty divided damages rule is that the
total damages of all parties are divided by the number of par-
ties found to be at fault in any degree with those parties at fault
being jointly and severally liable to all parties whether at fault
or not.'"'
An example of the different results achieved under the ad-
miralty divided damages rule and the Wisconsin comparative
negligence rule (the application of which is solely dependent on
the situs of the accident) is as follows: Assume factually that
boat A is 90 percent at fault, having sustained damages of
$50,000, and that boat B is 10 percent at fault with damages
of $1,000. If the accident had occurred on Wisconsin's federal
waters, each party would be liable for one-half of the damages,
or $25,000, under admiralty's divided damages rule. Had the
accident occurred on Wisconsin inland waters, boat A would be
liable for $50,000 plus 90 percent of $1,000 or $50,900 and boat
B for 10 percent of $1,000 or $100. Both boat A and B would
be jointly and severally liable to any third party not at fault
either under admiralty or Wisconsin law.'12 As a result of the
divided damages rule, it is imperative that in a federal waters
accident case in either state or federal court a defendant should
not only answer denying liability but also should allege affirm-
atively the negligence of the plaintiff and counter-claim for his
own damages.
IE. TORT CONCEPTS IN ADMIRALTY LAW
A. Concepts of Fault
On the state's inland waters, comparative negligence rules
are applicable.'"3 However, the admiralty rule of divided
damges is applicable in state court under the "saving to suit-
ors" clause or in federal court if the accident occurred on Wis-
consin's federal waters.' 4
The effects of admiralty fault are as follows: If neither vessel
is at fault, each must pay its own losses and no liability at-
taches.' ' If the collision is the fault of one of the vessels only,
101. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
102. Id.; Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
103. Wis. STAT. §§ 895.045, .048 (1975); Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d
120, 177 N.W.2d 513 (1970).
104. The Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 434 (1855).
105. The Clara, 102 U.S. 200 (1880).
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that vessel must bear its own loss and pay the other's damages
as well.""a Where both vessels are at fault, regardless of relative
degree of fault, the damages are equally divided between them
so that each vessel bears one-half of the total damages. 7 It
should be noted that this would be quite a deviation from the
concept of comparative negligence applicable to the state's in-
land waters.' 8
It is customary in an admiralty collision case for the defen-
dant to counterclaim against the plaintiff because of the effect
of the fault rules. If the defendant merely answers by denying
his own fault and the court then finds both boats at fault, the
answering defendant's damages are not taken into account.
Where the counterclaiming defendant can place all fault on the
plaintiff, he can then recover all of his damages from the plain-
tiff. Even where there is little damage suffered by the defen-
dant, he can reduce his liability to half by having the court find
any degree of fault with respect to the plaintiff.0 9 Therefore, a
defendant involved in a boating accident on Wisconsin's fed-
eral waters and who is in a state court under the "saving to
suitors" clause should carefully evaluate the invoking of admi-
ralty rules for tort damages either in the state court or through
removal to federal court.
It should be noted that a state court sitting in its concurrent
jurisdictional capacity in an admiralty matter cannot apply
under the "saving to suitors" clause the common law defenses
of contributory negligence, fellow servant rule, assumption of
risk, measure of recovery, or comparative negligence, since
these are common law or state law and not admiralty con-
cepts."0
Admiralty liability resulting from collisions is premised on
fault and not on the mere fact that there was an impact be-
tween two vessels or a vessel and another object."' There are
two types of fault which permit the party to a collision to avoid
liability. These are "inscrutable" fault and "inevitable" acci-
dent. "Inscrutable fault" occurs when "the Court can see that
106. Id.
107. The Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 434 (1855).
108. WIS. STAT. §§ 895.045, .048 (1975).
109. GILMORE & BLAcK, supra note 3, at 498-500.
110. Pope & Talbott v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson,
496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1974).
111. The Java, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 189 (1872).
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a mere fault has been committed but is unable, from the con-
flict of testimony, or otherwise, to locate it.""2 Under this doc-
trine, the settled rule is that no one can recover anything from
anyone else." 3
The second type of excusable fault is that of an "inevitable"
accident. This is equivalent to an Act of God where all reasona-
bly required precautions have been taken and the accident
occurred anyway."' Inevitable accidents have been referred to
by admiralty courts as "unavoidable.""15 The phrase
"inevitable fault" means that neither party has been able to
sustain its burden of proving the fault of the other. "The
'inevitable accident' defense is most often invoked when a ves-
sel has been caught in the force of a storm and driven against
another vessel or vessels" or otherwise caused damage or in-
jury." ' In such a case, the presumption is against the moving
vessel although rebuttable by the "inevitable accident con-
cept.""17 There are two factors to be considered in the
"inevitable accident" defense: "(1) the reasonableness of pre-
cautions taken and (2) the circumstances known or reasonably
to be anticipated."""
A narrow exception to the strict enforcement of the rules
and standards of prudent navigation is found in the doctrine
of errors in extremis. This exception applies where "the vessel
through no fault of its own is placed in a position where colli-
sion is seemingly imminent and shall not be cast at fault for
action taken in violation of the Rules" or other standards of due
care in order to attempt to avoid the accident."9
B. Duties and Standards of Care
The concept of "fault," as discussed above, is based on the
assumption that there is a proper standard applicable to the
operation of boats. There are four possible sources for the mari-
time "rules of the road" on Wisconsin waters:
(1) Statutory rules of navigation which are comprised of
112. The Worthington & Davis, 19 F. 836, 839 (E.D. Mich. 1883).
113. The Grace Girdler, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 196 (1869).
114. See Steinback v. Rae, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 532 (1852).
11. Dunton v. Allen S.S. Co., 119 F. 590 (3d Cir. 1903).
116. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 488.
117. The Louisiana, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 164 (1866).
118. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 488.
119. Id. at 491.
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the Great Lakes Rules, 2 the Western Rivers Rules,1 21
and the Wisconsin inland waters rules. 22
(2) Administrative rules and regulations, the so-called
"Pilot Rules" issued by the Coast Guard.
2 3
(3) Established local "customs" not contradicting any of
the preceding.' 24 It should be noted that of the cases
that will be discussed, The John D. Rockefeller'25 rep-
resented an application of a local rule on the Missis-
sippi River that was treated as a justifiable departure
from the requirements of the Western Rivers special
circumstances rule.'
26
(4) The general requirements of good seamanship and due
care.'
2 7
The violation of the applicable statutes or regulations in an
accident situation is considered statutory fault (negligence per
se) in admiralty, and in order to escape liability, it must be
shown that such fault did not and could not have contributed
to causing the accident. 28 In The Farragut, the ship failed to
maintain a proper lookout, but it became aware of the other
ship in sufficient time so that the fault could not have had a
causal connection with the subsequent collision. Under the
Pennsylvania rule, the vessel guilty of statutory fault must
prove that such fault did not and could not have contributed
to or caused the accident.' 2 The violation of either the Wiscon-
sin boating and safety statutes or regulations would be consid-
ered as negligence per se.'30 It should be noted that the rules
applicable to the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River and
their respective tributaries and to the Wisconsin inland waters
are neither identical nor interchangeable. Depending on the
situs of the tort, the specific rule applicable to that particular
120. 33 U.S.C. § 241-95 (1970).
121. Id. §§ 301-56 (1970).
122. Wis. STAT. 44 30.50-.99 (1975).
123. The Great Lakes Regulations are contained in 33 C.F.R. § 90.01-.30 (1972).
The Western River Rules are contained in 33 C.F.R. §§ 95.01-.80 (1972). The Wisconsin
inland waters rules are found in Wis. ADM. CODE § NRS.
124. Union Oil Co. v. Tug Mary Malloy, 414 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1969); The John
D. Rockefeller, 272 F. 67 (4th Cir. 1921); The Transfer No. 21, 248 F. 459 (2nd Cir.
1917); The Lucerne, 204 F. 981 (2nd Cir. 1913).
125. 272 F. 67 (4th Cir. 1921).
126. 33 U.S.C. § 350 (1970).
127. Miller v. Allied Chem. Corp., 406 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1969).
128. The Farragut, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 334 (1870).
129. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
130. Weiss v. Holman, 58 Wis. 2d 608, 207 N.W.2d 660 (1973).
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body of water should be carefully studied.
In federal water, any boat 3' which is involved in a collision,
accident or other casualty is required to render all practical and
necessary assistance to persons and property affected by the
collision, accident or casualty and to save them from danger
caused by collision, accident or casualty to the extent possible
without seriously endangering his own vessel or persons
aboard. 132 Any person rendering such assistance is excluded
from civil damages where he acted as an ordinary, reasonable
and prudent person would have acted under the same or simi-
lar circumstances. 13
On Wisconsin's waters, all boats,131 whether or not involved,
are required to stop and render assistance 35 upon notice of a
collision, 13 but such boats do not enjoy the benefit of statutory
exoneration for due care as provided in federal law. 37 At com-
mon law, the Wisconsin boater who was not a contributing
cause of the accident and who stopped to render assistance in
an emergency situation was liable for damages only where his
action or inaction was not reasonable or prudent under the then
existing emergency conditions.13 Where the emergency was
caused in whole or in part by his own negligent act 139 or as a
matter of law (i.e., a navigational rule violation),40 the emer-
gency (rescue) doctrine is not applicable.
The Wisconsin law requires the rendering of assistance re-
gardless of a boater's involvement. In contrast, the federal rule
is applicable only in the event of involvement. The admiralty
rule, however, exonerates even the original tortfeasor for his
subsequent rescue attempts when reasonably done under the
then existing circumstances. Wisconsin's rule has no subse-
quent exoneration when a boater was originally at fault for the
accident.
Where a vessel fails to stand by and render assistance as
required by the federal acts, it is presumed to be at fault for
131. 46 U.S.C. § 1452(1), (2) (Supp. V 1975).
132. 33 U.S.C. § 367 (1970); 46 U.S.C. § 1465(a) (Supp. V 1975).
133. 46 U.S.C. § 1465(b) (Supp. V 1975).
134. Wis. STAT. § 30.50(1) (1975).
135. Id. § 30.67(1) (1975).
136. Id. § 30.675(1) (1975).
137. 46 U.S.C. § 1465(b) (Supp. V 1975).
138. Zillmer v. Miglautsch, 35 Wis. 2d 691, 151 N.W.2d 741 (1967).
139. Ivy v. Tower Ins. Co., 32 Wis. 2d 231, 145 N.W.2d 214 (1966).
140. Conery v. Tackmaier, 34 Wis. 2d 511, 149 N.W.2d 575 (1967).
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the collision and is subject to federal' or state' criminal pen-
alties. This presumption is rebuttable by proof to the con-
trary.' 43
C. Wrongful Death Action
Admiralty law has two wrongful death statutes. One is the
Jones Act'44 which pertains to crew members for hire and to
their injuries and/or death occurring while within the cope of
their employment. The other is the Death on the High Seas
Act 4 5 which covers the death of any person as a result of
"wrongful act, neglect or default occurring on the High
Seas."'46
The Jones Act is applicable to death and/or injury claims
on Wisconsin's federal waters where the claimant is an em-
ployee of the boat owner or operator and had been acting within
the scope of his employment when injured.'47 The action can be
brought in either a state or federal proceeding, but it remains
subject to federal substantive law in either court.'48 Unlike Wis-
consin's Worker's Compensation Law, there are no damage
limitations,'49 and the cause of action exists upon the em-
ployer's negligence. '1
Ordinarily, passengers and co-operators of a pleasure boat
are not treated as employees under the Jones Act since there
is no financial consideration given for their services. However,
where a person is treated as a common law employee or is
"working his passage," he may be treated as an employee
which entitles him to recovery under the Jones Act. 15' This
amounts to a rough equivalent of marine worker's compensa-
tion. A seaman has been defined as anyone who in the course
of his work exposes himself to risks traditionally associated
with maritime duties of a ship's crew.'52 The Jones Act further
141. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1465(a), 1483 (Supp. V 1975).
142. Wis. STAT. §§ 30.67(1), 30.80(2) (1975).
143. Greaud v. Gulf Oil Corp., 174 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1949); Coule Lines v. United
States, 96 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. La. 1951).
144. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
145. Id. § 761-68 (1970).
146. Id. § 761 (1970).
147. Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959).
148. Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124 (1936).
149. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
150. DeZon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660 (1943).
151. In re Read's Petition, 224 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
152. Garrett v. Gutzeit, 491 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1974).
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includes recovery for injury or death resulting from the unsea-
worthiness of the boat. This is a legal concept of liability with-
out fault. The seaman need only show that the injury was
caused by the boat not being reasonably fit for its intended
use.,153
The Death on the High Seas Act is not applicable to Wis-
consin because of the jurisdictional definition of what consti-
tutes the "high seas.1 ' 54 Therefore, there is no federal statute
for the wrongful death of a nonseaman occurring in a state's
territorial waters.' 55 But where there is a state statute creating
a wrongful death action for a tort committed on its territorial
waters, the admiralty court will entertain a suit in personam
for damages.'-"
Wisconsin's wrongful death statutes'5 7 are applicable to the
death of a passenger, third-party or a nonemployee crew mem-
ber on the state's inland and federal waters.5 ' The action is in
personam and can be brought in either state or admiralty
court,'159 both of which must apply Wisconsin substantive
law. 0
The Federal Boat Safety Act of 197111 provides for certain
safety requirements and standards in manufacturing, construc-
tion and furnishing of equipment for all types of recreational
boats.1 2 Violations of these equipment standards by a manu-
facturer or supplier could result in product liability being im-
posed on the manufacturer, retailer or lessor of the boat and/or
its component parts.13
A vicarious liability suit for the nonowner-user's negligent
operation of a boat can be maintained against the owner in an
153. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
154. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970); Warnken v. Moody, 22 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1921);
O'Brien v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 286 F. 301 (D.C. N.Y. 1922), rev'd, 293 F. 170 (2nd
Cir. 1923).
155. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
156. Id.
157. Wis. STAT. §§ 895.01, 895.04 (1975).
158. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
159. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953).
160. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
161. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1489 (Supp. V 1975).
162. Id. §§ 1454, 1455 (Supp. V 1975).
163. See Schaefer v. Michigan-Ohio Nav. Co., 416 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1969); George
v. Tonjes, 414 F. Supp. 1199 (W.D. Wis. 1976); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155




admiralty in rem action for the value of the boat, but not in
personam absent a statutory enactment.'64 The Federal Boat
Safety Act directly affects the user by imposing any personal
liability of the owner upon the user in personam.'6 5 Wisconsin
has no vicarious liability running from the negligence of the
user to the owner who is not the lessor in a products liability
situation.'6 Other states have imposed vicarious liability on
the owner for the negligent operation of a boat by the
nonowner-user.
D. Damage Relief and Insurance
A ship is liable for the damages it has caused resulting in
an in rem judgment against the ship itself.'67 The judgment
creates a lien which will allow the ship to be sold free and clear
of all other claims or security interests regardless of time of
perfection. It does not seem very practical to sue most pleasure
boats in rem because the boat itself has relatively limited value
and a judgment in rem against the ship will serve as res judi-
cata to an in personam claim against the owner. However,
because charter boats often are of substantial value, an in rem
claim against the boat may be considered where there may be
no liability of the lessor and the charterer does not have suffi-
cient assets or insurance. The fact that a boat is chartered in
no way effects an in rem claim or lien created by the tortious
use of the boat by the charterer.'6 8
Unlike state courts, admiralty courts may award attorney's
fees to the successful party as part of his damages.' Costs are
divisible at the discretion of the court.'7 ° Interest,'7' actual
damages, 72 and pain and suffering' 3 are all elements of dam-
164. The Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464, 467-68 (1901).
165. 46 U.S.C. § 1461(c) (Supp. V 1975).
166. In George v. Tonjes, 414 F. Supp. 1199, 1201-02 (W.D. Wis. 1976) the federal
court (1) noted the past sensitivity of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in adopting new
trends in the products liability field, (2) concluded that in Wisconsin there could be a
valid cause of action for strict liability in tort against lessors, and (3) held that there
were sufficient allegations to state a claim against the defendants, who were negligent
in leasing a defective aircraft.
167. The Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464 (1901).
168. Id.; Burns Bros. v. The Central R.R., 202 F.2d 910 (2nd Cir. 1953).
169. Fleishmann v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967); Vaughan v. Atkinson,
369 U.S. 527 (1962); The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 88 (1824).
170. The Scotland, 118 U.S. 507 (1886).
171. United States v. The Thelsa, 266 U.S. 328 (1924).
172. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal v. United States, 287 U.S. 170 (1932).




ages in admiralty as they are in Wisconsin state court practice.
On federal waters, a crewman is entitled to the right of
maintenance and cure against the ship (in rem) and against the
owner-employer (in personam).'' In the case of a bareboat
charter, the remedy lies only against the ship and the
charterer-employer, but not against the boat owner.7, He is
entitled to recovery for any injury or illness suffered without his
own misconduct while a member of the ship's crew, without
any causal relationship between the injury or illness and his
shipboard duties, including his periods of shore leave.'76
The nature of relief is for room, board, medical, and travel
expenses to his home upon recovery.' An injured crewman on
federal waters is entitled to recovery for maintenance and cure
in addition to any remedies available under the Jones Act.'78
This remedy applies to pleasure boats as well as commercial
vessels when the owner is placed in the role of employer of the
injured or sick worker and when the injury is not conditioned
upon the owner's negligence.' 7 The owner's obligation to a
crewmember for maintenance and cure is not eliminated by,
but is coextensive with, his obligations under the Jones Act'""
since those obligations arise when the owner is negligent. There
is an absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel whether as the
owner, operator'8 ' or lessor of a chartered boat.'8 2 Under com-
mon law, liability for maintenance and cure arises regardless
of the owner's negligence.' 3
Protection from the above-discussed liabilities and dam-
ages is provided by three types of insurance policies that are
generally available to the recreational boater: (a) the yacht
policy, (b) the outboard motorboat policy, and (c) the home-
174. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
175. Haskins v. Point-Towing Co., 421 F.2d 532 (3rd Cir. 1970).
176. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
177. Waterman S.S. Co. v. Jones, 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
178. Waterman S.S. Co. v. Jones, 318 U.S. 724 (1943); Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson,
278 U.S. 130 (1928).
179. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 283-84.
180, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
181. Woldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724 (1967); Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
182. Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139 (1918); Work v.
Leathers, 97 U.S. 379 (1878).
183. Fitzgerald v. A.L. Benhands & Co., 475 F.2d 165 (2nd Cir. 1973).
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owner's policy.'" The first two types of policies are true marine
insurance policies relative to the terms and provisions of cover-
age. The homeowner's policy, unlike the marine policies, is not
directed to a specifically named boat, but treats the boat
owned by the insured homeowner as an adjunct piece of prop-
erty and subjects it to other terms and conditions of the home-
owner's policy relative to coverage, damage and liability. A
typical homeowner's policy restricts the insured boat to length
and/or specified horsepower. The homeowner's policy also re-
stricts the perils against which the boat is being insured by
excluding wind or hail damages where the boat is outside the
enclosure of the principally insured building, theft while the
boat is left unattended, and bodily injury or property damage
arising out of the ownership of the boat where the horsepower
and/or length limitations are exceeded.
The terms and conditions of a marine policy are treated as
an integral part of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and are
subject to litigation and determination in the federal admiralty
court. '
A typical marine or yacht policy will be divided into three
main categories: (1) hull insurance, covering the ship itself, (2)
protection and indemnity, covering the boat owner against lia-
bilities, and, (3) payment insurance for reasonable medical and
funeral expenses incurred as a result of injuries sustained while
on the craft or while boarding or leaving it. A marine yacht
policy will specify the specific person and property insured, the
location and insured geographical area of use of that property,
and insured and excepted uses. It is common on a yacht policy
to exclude commercial use of the boat and damages incident
to racing sailboats. It further specifies the exact nature of the
perils to the hull which typically may include an all risk cover-
age.
A term in a marine policy which normally does not appear
in the homeowner's coverage is the requirement of seaworthi-
ness of the insured boat as a condition precedent to any en-
forceable coverage. The failure of seaworthiness of the vessel
voids ab initio the marine insurance coverage. 88 The voiding of
the marine insurance policy for lack of seaworthiness does not
184. Jaques, "Maritime Law and the Small Boat Owner," CASE & COMMENT 3
(May-June 1977).
185. DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1913) (No. 3776).
186. New Orleans, T. & M. Ry. v. Union Marine Ins. Co., 286 F. 32 (5th Cir. 1923).
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depend on either the named insured's knowledge'17 or fault.' 8
Where the marine policy is a time policy, the "American Rule"
states that there is no implied warranty of seaworthiness in
such a policy.189 The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on
the "American Rule" with respect to time marine insurance
policies and the implied warranty for seaworthiness. It is as-
sumed, however, that if called upon to deal with this issue, the
Supreme Court would not uphold the warranty.8 0
E. Chartering a Boat
Chartering contains a few pitfalls of which the boat owner
should be advised. The charter agreement or instrument is
called a "charter party." It is "a specific and . . .express
contract by which the owner lets a vessel or some peculiar part
thereof to another for a specific time or use."' 9 ' An operator
may wish to charter a boat rather than purchase it, or he may
wish to lease out his own boat when he cannot use it. In either
event, he should be aware of the types of contracts available.
A "bareboat" or "demised" charter is created when the owner
of the vessel completely and exclusively relinquishes posses-
sion, command and navigation of the boat. It is just short of
transfer of ownership.'9 - Control is the indication of a bareboat
charter. The charterer is entitled to direct navigation and em-
ployment of the boat,'93 and he pays the crew wages and all
operating expenses and, furthermore, the full legal liabilities of
ownership fall upon him.' 4
In contrast, a "time charter" is where the vessel is leased
to the charterer but the management and control remains with
the owner, such as in the case of the chartered fishing party
boat. The owner selects and pays the master and all the operat-
ing expenses. Liability remains in the owner since he is still in
control.'95
187. Richelieu & Ontario Navigation Co. v. Boston Marine Ins. Co., 130 U.S. 408
(1890).
188. Bullard v. Roger-Williams Ins. Co., 4 F. Cas. 643 (C.C.D. R.I. 1852) (No.
2,122).
189. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. v. Gray, 240 F.2d 460 (2nd Cir. 1957).
190. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 765.
191. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Vang, 73 F.2d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1934).
192. Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698 (1962); Fitzgerald v. A.L. Burbank & Co.,
451 F.2d 670 (2nd Cir. 1971).
193. Dailey v. Carroll, 248 F. 466 (2nd Cir. 1917).
194. The Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464 (1901); Sheriffs v. Pugh, 22 Wis. 273 (1867).
195. Nichimen Co. v. M.V. Farland, 462 F.2d 319 (2nd Cir. 1972); Bergan v. Inter-
national Freighting Corp., 254 F.2d 231 (2nd Cir. 1958).
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A "voyage charter" is rarely used by recreational boaters.
The legal status of the charter is the same as for the time
charter.
CONCLUSION
As discussed above, Wisconsin has two possible legal rules
applicable to a recreational boat accident. The federal admi-
ralty rules are to be used by either the state or federal courts if
the accident occurred on the Great Lakes or the Mississippi
River. The state rules are applicable to a Wisconsin inland
waters tort and/or nonemployee wrongful death action in either
state court or on the law side (nonadmiralty) of the federal
court. While admiralty court can grant an in rem judgment
against the boat, this usually is not advantageous because of
the relatively low value of the boat relative to the tort damages.
Most suits, therefore, would be in personam in either state or
federal court, rather than in rem.
In short, the significant differences between a federal admi-
ralty suit and an inland waters state action are found in the
admiralty procedures of no jury trial, varying degrees of fault,
divided damages without comparison of negligence, more
explicit navigational rules of the road, and specific insurance
coverage and policy interpretations distinct from nonadmiralty
insurance policies. Furthermore, admiralty procedures bar
most common law and state statutory defenses. A tortfeasor
may be exonerated for post-tort actions if he stands by and
renders assistance after the accident. Vicarious and limited
liability may be imposed on the nonnegligent boat owner plus
the duty of maintenance and cure upon a boat owner when
neither he nor a crew member is at fault for the crew member's
injury.
When faced with a Wisconsin boating accident case, coun-
sel must make a careful evaluation of whether the suit should
be started in state or federal court, and if started in state court,
whether it should be removed to federal court. The judicial
determination of whether the case is at law or in admiralty may
largely determine the outcome of the suit and the relative lia-
bilities of the parties.
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